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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to assess how incarcerations persist across the world. 
The focus is on 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. 
 
Design/methodology/approach - The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of 
Moments.  In order to increase room for policy implications, the dataset is decomposed into 
sub-samples based on income levels, religious domination, openness to the sea, regional 
proximity and legal origins. 
 
Findings - The following main findings are established. Incarcerations are more persistent in 
low income, Christian-protestant and Latin American countries while comparative evidence is 
not feasible on the basis of landlockedness and legal origins owing to unfavorable post-
estimation diagnostic tests. Justifications for the comparative advantages and relevance of 
findings to theory-building in public economics are discussed.   
 
Practical implications - First, income levels matter in the persistence of incarcerations 
because low income nations  vis-à-vis their  high income counterparts, have less financial 
resources with which to prevent and deal with events like terrorism, political instability and 
violence that lead to incarcerations. Second, the intuition for religious domination builds on 
the fact that liberal societies can be more associated with incarcerations compared to 
conservative societies. The main theoretical contribution of this study to the literature is that 
we have built on empirical validity to provide theoretical justification as to why categorizing 
countries on the basis of selected fundamental characteristics determine cross-country 
variations in incarcerations. Such evidence is important for theory-building in public 
economics. 
 
Originality/value- It is important for policy makers to understand the persistence of 
incarcerations across nations because resources could be  allocated to regions and countries, 
contingent on the relative importance of future incarceration tendencies.    
 
JEL Classification:  K42; P50 
Keywords: Incarcerations; Global evidence; Persistence; GMM; Convergence; World   
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to assess how incarcerations persist across the world. The 
positioning of the inquiry builds on two main trends in academic and policy circles, notably: 
the relevance of understanding drivers of incarcerations and gaps in the literature. The points 
are engaged in chronological order.  
First, there are growing levels of incarcerations across the world on the one hand and 
on the other hand, increasing levels of government expenditure allocated to the funding of the 
underlying incarcerations. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) (2016), over the past 
decades, whereas societal security and safety have been increasing, there has also been a 
substantial increase in government expenditure used to control and prevent violence, notably: 
incarcerations and policing. To put this point into perspective, the GPI report of 2015 
maintains that more than thirteen per cent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
allocated to the prevention and fighting of violence (Anderson, 2015). Accordingly, about 
14.3 trillion USD (representing approximately 13.4 per cent of global GDP) was devoted to 
this cause. The underlying cost is equivalent to the total annual output of Brazil, Canada, 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017).  
Second, the extant literature has failed to engage the persistence of incarcerations. The 
contemporary literature has fundamentally focused on inter alia: risk assessment in 
sentencing decisions as a remedy to mass incarceration (Kopkin et al., 2017); intersectional 
analysis on parallels between mass deportation and mass incarceration (Tanya, 2017); factors 
affecting the use of drug during incarceration (Rao et al., 2016); the role of legal origins in 
cross-country incarcerations (D’Amico & Williamson, 2015); whether restorative justice 
reduces incarceration (Wood, 2015); the incarceration of substantially  traumatized 
adolescents  (Mallet, 2015); factors of delinquency among incarcerated male juveniles 
(Olashore et al., 2017); nexus between public health, mass incarceration and inequality 
(Wilderman & Wang, 2017) and supporting strategies for children and families that are 
affected by parental incarceration (Kjellstrand, 2017).  
 We now discuss the theoretical underpinnings for persistence in incarcerations. These 
theoretical foundations are consistent with recent literature on persistence within the banking 
sector (Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; Goddard et al., 2011); inclusive development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017a) and knowledge economy (Asongu, 2017).  Moreover, the underlying 
theoretical underpinnings are broadly in line with the literature on income convergence which 
has been considerably documented with the context of neoclassical growth estimations 
(Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992;  Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995). This 
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theoretical framework has also been recently extended to other development fields, notably: 
inclusive human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014a) and financial market 
development (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013, 2014b, 2014c).   
 After the Keynesian era, new economic growth theories saw the light of day with 
momentum from the neoclassical revolution which enabled income convergence among 
nations. Conceptions of market equilibrium were articulated with absolute decrease in cross-
country income disparities. Such income catch-up or convergence in the wealth of nations 
was established to be the result of free-market competition policies (see Mayer-Foulkes, 
2010). Initial studies that concluded on the absence of convergence attributed the divergence 
to, among others: the possibility of multiple equilibria and differences in initial conditions of 
development (see Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997). On the contrary, there is another strand of the 
literature which argues that regardless of initial conditions of development, decreasing cross-
country variations in income levels is feasible from the standpoint of countries’ common 
steady-states or long run equilibria (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 What is important to note from both schools for our study is the fact that both schools 
of thought agree on the criteria for establishing convergence or a cross-country decreasing 
tendency of differences in income levels. We build on these common criteria for establishing 
convergence because the purpose of this inquiry is not to take sides with either school, but to 
assess convergence in incarcerations across the world.  
 In the light of the underlying theoretical insights, this study investigates the 
persistence of incarcerations using global data. The notion of persistence in the study is 
understood in relation to how past observations in incarcerations affect future observations in 
incarcerations. From an empirical perspective, the hypothesis of persistence can be 
investigated with a dynamic estimation approach. Such a dynamic technique is the 
Generalized Method of Moments that has been employed in recent literature to investigate 
persistence in economic phenomena (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018).  
It is important for policy makers to understand the persistence of incarcerations across 
nations because resources could be devoted to regions and countries contingent on the relative 
importance of future incarceration tendencies. To this end, in order to increase room for 
policy implications, the dataset is decomposed into some sub-samples based on income levels, 
religious domination, openness to the sea, regional proximity and legal origins. The rest of the 
study is structured in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology 
while the empirical results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with implications 
and future research directions.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
A sample of 163 nations in the world is examined with data for the period 2010 to 2015 from 
a plethora of sources, namely, the: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; Qualitative assessment by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and United Nations Committee on Contributions 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS). 
The dependent variable is the incarceration rate: the number of jailed persons per 100, 
000 people. It is important to note that the independent variable of interest with which 
persistence is established is the lagged dependent variable. Variables in the conditioning 
information set include: perceptions of criminality; security officers & polices; political 
instability; weapons imports; displaced persons and military expenditure. While these  
indicators are potential determinants of incarcerations (Mallet, 2015; Wood, 2015; D’Amico 
& Williamson, 2015; Rao et al., 2016 ; Kopkin et al., 2017 ; Olashore et al., 2017; Wilderman 
& Wang, 2017; Kjellstrand, 2017), the expected signs and effects are contingent on specific 
fundamental characteristics.  
 As highlighted in the introduction, in order to improve room for policy implications, 
some fundamental characteristics are adopted, namely: (i) income levels (High income, Upper 
middle income, Lower middle income and Low income); (ii) religious domination (Christian 
with Catholic domination;  Christian with Protestant inclination;  Christian countries in which 
another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant;  Islam-
dominated countries and Buddhist-oriented countries); (iii) openness to sea (Landlocked and  
Coastal countries); (iv) legal origins (English Common law, French Civil law, German Civil 
law,  Scandinavian Civil law and Socialists countries) and (v) regions (South Asia; Europe & 
Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; Middle East & North Africa; sub-Saharan Africa;  
Latin America and North America). These fundamental features have been employed in 
recent comparative development literature (Narayan et al., 2011; Mlachila et al., 2016; Beegle 
et al., 2016; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b).   
 The categorization of the sample by legal origins builds on La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289) while classification by income groups is in accordance with the World Bank’s 
stratification1.   
                                                 
1
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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While Landlocked versus Coastal nations can easily be viewed from a World map, 
information on dominant religions is from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact 
Book (CIA, 2011). More details about the definitions of variables and corresponding sources 
are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the summary statistics and sampled countries are 
disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix.   
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Specification  
 The estimation strategy adopted in this study is the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM). The empirical approach is consistent with recent literature on the persistence of 
macroeconomic phenomena (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017). Moreover, five 
additional reasons motivate the choice of this empirical strategy. First, it is apparent that the 
numbers of countries are higher compared to the units of periodicity in each country. Hence, 
the N(163)>T(6) condition for the employment of the GMM is met. Second, incarceration is 
by definition persistent because the correlation between incarceration and its first lag is 0.972, 
which is substantially higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 that is needed to 
establish persistence. Third, cross-country differences are not eliminated with the estimation 
approach because it is employed on a panel data structure. Fourth, endogeneity is addressed 
with the estimation procedure from two main perspectives. On the one hand, the 
instrumentation process is designed to account for simultaneity in the explanatory variables. 
On the other hand, the control for time-invariant omitted variables accounts for the 
unobserved heterogeneity. Fifth, biases that are inherent in the difference estimator are 
addressed with the system estimator.  
 The Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) is employed in 
this study because when compared with traditional GMM methods (systems and difference 
GMM approaches), it control for cross-sectional dependence and limits the proliferation of 
instruments (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; 
Boateng et al., 2018). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
tititih
h
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where, tiI ,
 
represents incarcerations in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
W  is the 
vector of control variables (criminality; security officers & polices; political instability;  
weapons imports; displaced persons and military expenditure),
 
 represents the coefficient of 
auto-regression which is one for the specification due to limited degrees of freedom, t
 
is the 
time-specific constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
2.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 It is important to devote space to clarifying identification and exclusion restrictions 
that are critical for a sound GMM specification approach. All explanatory indicators are 
considered to be endogenous explaining (i.e. predetermined or suspected endogenous) 
variables while the time-invariant variables are considered to be strictly exogenous. Recent 
empirical literature has employed a similar identification strategy (see Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng et al., 2018). The process of identification is consistent with 
Roodman (2009b) because the author has argued that is not feasible for time invariant 
indicators to become endogenous after first difference2.   
 As concerns exclusion restrictions, given the identification process, the selected 
strictly exogenous variables affect the outcome variable (or incarcerations) exclusively 
through the predetermined or suspected endogenous variables. In addition, the underlying 
exclusion restriction assumption is valid if  the alternative hypothesis corresponding to the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity is rejected. Put in other words, 
incarcerations are elucidated by the strictly exogenous variables exclusively via 
predetermined mechanisms or variables.  
 In the light of the above insights, in the findings that are reported in Section 3, the 
exclusion restriction assumption is valid if the alternative hypothesis related to the DHT 
which is connected to instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq.(diff)) is rejected. It is particularly 
worthwhile to note that this process of confirming exclusion restrictions is consistent with the 
standard IV approach. Accordingly in the standard framework, a rejection of the null 
hypothesis related to the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an implication that 
the strictly exogenous variables do not affect the outcome variables exclusively through the 
                                                 
2
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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predetermined mechanisms or suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
 
3. Empirical results 
 The empirical results are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. While the findings of Table 
1 correspond to income levels, religious domination and openness to sea, those of Table 2 are 
focused on legal origins and regions. In the two tables, the last column corresponds to the full 
sample whereas prior columns disclose findings corresponding to the fundamental 
characteristics. Four principal information criteria are employed to assess the validity of 
GMM models3. In light of these criteria, some specifications are not valid because they fail to 
pass the post-estimation diagnostic tests, namely: Europe & Central Asia; sub-Saharan Africa 
and French civil law countries. Specifications pertaining to these fundamental features are 
consistently invalid because the null hypotheses of the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test 
in differences are rejected. Note should be taken of the fact that the validity of models is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing persistence. In what follows, we 
discuss the information criteria.  
 The following requirements should be met before persistence is established: the 
estimated lagged incarceration variable should be significant on the one hand and meet the 
convergence criterion on the other hand. The criterion for convergence is that the absolute 
value of the estimated lagged dependent variable should be within the interval of zero and 
one. More insights into this criterion are apparent in recent literature on convergence (Fung, 
2009, p. 58; Asongu, 2013).  It is important to note that in the standard GMM procedure, the 
estimated lagged dependent variable is reported and then one is subtracted from the 
coefficient to obtain beta (β= a-1). Within this framework, the information criterion for 
convergence is <0.  Furthermore, the estimated lagged dependent variable can be disclosed 
directly and an alternative criterion  (“0< lagged value <1”) is employed to establish 
convergence  (see Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 
23; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, p. 459).  
 
 
                                                 
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). Also see Tchamyou and Asongu (2017).  
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Table 1: Persistence in incarcerations with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Incarcerations  
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  0.427*** 0.265 0.534*** 0.034 0.096 0.137 0.157 0.890*** 0.937 -
0.172** 
0.463** 0.581** 
 (0.004) (0.295) (0.000) (0.526) (0.530) (0.228) (0.888) (0.000) (0.294) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) 
Incarcerations (-1) 0.879*** 0.876*** 0.741*** 0.996*** 1.000*** 0.978*** 0.824*** 0.463*** 0.855*** 1.034**
* 
0.890**
* 
0.861*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crime -0.067** -0.026 -0.037 0.007 0.084** -0.003 -2.121 0.004 -0.003 0.074**
* 
-
0.059** 
-
0.085*** 
 (0.016) (0.431) (0.349) (0.589) (0.013) (0.785) (0.124) (0.879) (0.980) (0.004) (0.024) (0.003) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.109*** 0.009 -
0.146*** 
0.006 -0.055 0.023** 0.452** -0.049 -0.087 0.037* 0.007 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.742) (0.000) (0.359) (0.112) (0.016) (0.031) (0.142) (0.327) (0.090) (0.748) (0.994) 
Political Instability 0.114*** -0.040 -0.038 -0.014* -
0.110*** 
0.003 0.885* 0.031 -0.120 -
0.076**
* 
-0.035 -0.014 
 (0.000) (0.145) (0.322) (0.094) (0.002) (0.805) (0.083) (0.313) (0.440) (0.000) (0.226) (0.623) 
Weapons import -0.020* 0.023 0.493*** -
0.046*** 
0.080*** -0.033 0.242 0.017 -0.097 -0.009 -
0.041** 
-0.040* 
 (0.061) (0.184) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.200) (0.397) (0.636) (0.388) (0.752) (0.022) (0.057) 
Displaced persons  0.036 0.039*** 0.009 0.017** 0.044 0.007 0.493 -0.068** -0.004 -0.006 0.069** 0.058** 
 (0.513) (0.005) (0.740) (0.019) (0.120) (0.354) (0.290) (0.038) (0.957) (0.689) (0.047) (0.033) 
Military Expenditure  0.039 0.043 0.006 0.008 -0.029 -
0.063*** 
0.407 0.065** 0.061 0.028* -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.184) (0.151) (0.867) (0.302) (0.261) (0.002) (0.443) (0.037) (0.720) (0.054) (0.689) (0.957) 
             
AR(1) (0.036) (0.100) (0.095) (0.227) (0.000) (0.084) (0.176) (0.048) (0.030) (0.034) (0.023) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.834) (0.358) (0.336) (0.223) (0.490) (0.306) (0.707) (0.404) (0.185) (0.107) (0.215) (0.110) 
Sargan OIR (0.002) (0.022) (0.082) (0.142) (0.029) (0.817) (0.007) (0.155) (0.120) (0.332) (0.008) (0.028) 
Hansen OIR (0.226) (0.647) (0.421) (0.462) (0.739) (0.981) (1.000) (0.783) (1.000) (0.736) (0.356) (0.648) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
            
H excluding group (0.350) (0.465) (0.202) (0.387) (0.384) (0.980) (0.936) (0.368) (1.000) (0.216) (0.071) (0.122) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.220) (0.651) (0.608) (0.480) (0.818) (0.885) (1.000) (0.874) (1.000) (0.928) (0.769) (0.943) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
(0.392) (0.783) (0.662) (0.754) (0.671) (0.594) (0.994) (0.661) (1.000) (0.564) (0.536) (0.613) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.116) (0.232) (0.118) (0.094) (0.621) (1.000) (1.000) (0.776) (0.921) (0.863) (0.147) (0.511) 
Fisher 247.40*** 224.92 
*** 
101.93 
*** 
2115.49 
*** 
328.65 
*** 
4963.03 
*** 
75.25 
*** 
16.55*** 443.78 
*** 
2161.06
*** 
158.57 
*** 
68.38*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and  the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR 
tests. HI: High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower  Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian 
countries with Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from 
Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Buddhism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not 
Landlocked countries.  
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Table 2: Persistence in incarcerations with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Variable: Incarcerations 
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  omitted -0.062 0.279 0.370 0.090 0.521*** n.a 0.197* 0.496*** 0.827 na na 0.581** 
  (0.832) (0.572) (0.281) (0.292) (0.007)  (0.068) (0.005) (0.138)   (0.010) 
Incarcerations 
(-1) 
0.485 0.851*** 1.087*** 0.806*** 0.969*** 0.992***  0.939*** 0.917*** 0.772***   0.861*** 
 (0.324) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Crime 0.546 0.147** -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 -0.040  -0.008 -0.063** 0.089   -
0.085*** 
 (0.327) (0.024) (0.588) (0.590) (0.461) (0.466)  (0.629) (0.044) (0.492)   (0.003) 
Security 
Officers & 
Police 
omitted 0.001 -0.035 -0.062** 0.049*** 0.016  0.001 0.008 -0.125*   -0.0002 
  (0.977) (0.366) (0.049) (0.001) (0.612)  (0.930) (0.790) (0.083)   (0.994) 
Political 
Instability 
-0.719 -0.048 0.082* 0.052 -0.029** 0.013  -0.019 -
0.070*** 
-0.038   -0.014 
 (0.302) (0.459) (0.051) (0.513) (0.045) (0.846)  (0.249) (0.008) (0.649)   (0.623) 
Weapons 
import 
omitted 0.036 0.013 0.018 -0.027* -0.022  -0.011 -0.017 -0.019   -0.040* 
  (0.457) (0.686) (0.552) (0.055) (0.667)  (0.450) (0.645) (0.804)   (0.057) 
Displaced 
persons  
-0.272 0.178*** -0.174 -0.008 0.033** -0.040  0.020** 0.046 -0.164   0.058** 
 (0.416) (0.002) (0.601) (0.812) (0.010) (0.155)  (0.044) (0.182) (0.373)   (0.033) 
Military 
Expenditure  
0.747 -0.044 -
0.157*** 
0.043 -0.002 -0.194**  -0.0001 0.016 0.057   -0.001 
 (0.302) (0.523) (0.004) (0.253) (0.926) (0.016)  (0.985) (0.545) (0.790)   (0.957) 
              
AR(1) (0.376) (0.056) (0.219) (0.033) (0.025) (0.009)  (0.017) (0.039) (0.100)   (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.386) (0.079) (0.520) (0.486) (0.081) (0.360)  (0.611) (0.097) (0.217)   (0.110) 
Sargan OIR (0.607) (0.000) (0.102) (0.538) (0.013) (0.485)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.014)   (0.028) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.556) (0.995) (0.996) (0.471) (0.914)  (0.505) (0.924) (0.994)   (0.648) 
DHT for 
instruments 
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
             
H excluding 
group 
(1.000) (0.401) (0.209) (0.840) (0.138) (0.282)  (0.432) (0.410) (0.336)   (0.122) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.586) (1.000) (0.992) (0.767) (0.993)  (0.500) (0.978) (1.000)   (0.943) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq (diff)) H 
excluding 
group 
(1.000) (0.581) (0.968) (0.995) (0.255) (0.649)  (0.270) (0.869) (0.951)   (0.613) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.376) (0.996) (0.722) (0.960) (1.000)  (0.981) (0.762) (1.000)   (0.511) 
Fisher 1805.22 
*** 
255.99 
*** 
280.79 
*** 
150.75 
*** 
336.10 
*** 
963.40 
*** 
 595.43 
*** 
94.54 
*** 
28.67 
*** 
  68.38*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31   31 
Countries  8 48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations  40 240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Eng: 
English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists 
countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  na: not applicable because of  issues in degrees of freedom.  
 
Given these insights, for two sub-samples that meet the information criteria for 
persistence, the sub-sample with a higher estimated value is acknowledged to reflect a higher 
degree of persistence in incarcerations. The magnitude of estimated lagged value is relevant 
because it reflects how past values of incarcerations affect future values of incarcerations. 
This is essentially because from a comparative perspective, higher estimated lagged values 
imply that future values of incarcerations are more proportionately affected by past values of 
incarcerations. The following findings can be established. First, incarcerations are more 
persistent in low income countries compared to their higher income counterparts. Second, in 
Christian-protestant countries, the persistence of incarcerations is more apparent vis-à-vis 
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their counterparts with other dominants religions. Third, it is difficult to assess comparative 
evidence from the criterion related to landlockedness because the estimated lagged value for 
the Landlocked sub-sample does not meet the information criteria required for the 
establishment of convergence. Fourth, incarcerations are most predominant in Latin American 
countries. Fifth, a comparative assessment is not feasible on the basis of legal origins because 
the French civil sample does not pass post-estimation diagnostic tests: autocorrelation is 
present in the residuals after estimation.  
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research direction  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess how incarcerations persist across the world. The focus is 
on 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015.  The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments.  In order to increase room for policy implications, the dataset is 
decomposed into some sub-samples based on income levels, religious domination, openness 
to the sea, regional proximity and legal origins. The following main findings are established. 
Incarcerations are more persistent in low income, Christian-protestant and Latin American 
countries while comparative evidence is not feasible on the basis of landlockedness and legal 
origins owing to negative post-estimation diagnostic tests. In what follows, we provide 
justifications for the comparative advantages and discuss attendant policy implications.     
 We first discuss the relevance of fundamental characteristics from which feasible 
comparison could not be established. First, legal origins are important in incarcerations 
because compared to French civil law countries, Common law nations are less associated with 
incarcerations. This difference is for a plethora of reasons, notably: in Common law tradition, 
the accused is not jailed until proven guilty, which is contrary to French civil law where a 
simple accusation leads to the incarceration of the accused. This narrative is broadly 
consistent with the relevance of legal origins in comparative economic development (La Porta 
et al., 1998, 1999; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2015). Second, as concerns landlockedness, there 
is an institutional cost of being closed from the sea (Arvis et al., 2007; Asongu & Le Roux, 
2017). Such an institutional cost is the additional time it takes to transport by land (i.e. 
through a neighboring coastal country), equipments needed for national security and broader 
economic development. Accordingly, transport by air is more expensive than transport by sea. 
It is also reasonable to postulate that institutional malfunctioning could be associated with 
higher levels of institutional violations and by extension the number of incarcerations. 
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 We now justify the relevance of significant comparisons. First, income levels matter in 
the persistence of incarcerations because low income nations  vis-à-vis their  high income 
counterparts have less financial resources with which to deal with events like terrorism 
(Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009), political instability and violence that lead to incarcerations. 
Moreover, beyond the reactionary approach, higher income countries also have more financial 
resources with which to engage in proactive efforts in view of preventing activities associated 
with violence, political instability and incarcerations.  
Second, the intuition for religious domination builds on the fact that liberal societies 
can be more associated with incarcerations compared to conservative societies. Recent 
literature has documented the importance of religious-orientation in comparative development 
(see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b). As shown in the findings, countries dominated by 
Protestant Christianity may be experiencing more incarcerations because of the Protestant 
ethic which may be associated with a higher propensity to strikes and civil unrests. According 
to Weber (2002) (first published in 1930), the Protestant ethic influences people to adopt 
modes of conduct that are contrary to mainstream thinking and by extension, violate the some 
established rules in society.  
 Beyond understanding how policy makers can leverage on the established connections 
between fundamental characteristics and incarcerations, it is important to note that since the 
established evidence of persistence is contingent on the conditioning information set (or 
control variables), policy makers can decrease or  increase the established drivers (in the 
conditioning information set) in order to ultimately limit persistence in incarcerations. Such 
policy relevance of factors in the conditioning information set is not blanket (or one size fits 
all) but contingent on fundamental characteristics. Overall, the analysis and corresponding 
implications for policy are contingent on the variables used in the conditioning information 
set.  
 The main theoretical contribution of this study to the literature is that we have built on 
empirical validity to provide theoretical justification as to why categorizing countries on the 
basis of selected fundamental characteristics determine cross-country variations in 
incarcerations. Such evidence is important for theory-building in public economics because 
applied econometrics should not be exclusively limited to the acceptance or rejection of 
existing theories (Naryan et al., 2011; Constatini & Lupi, 2005). 
 Future studies can build on these insights to extend knowledge on how growing rates 
of incarcerations can be reduced on the one hand and on the other hand, on what countries 
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with high rates of incarcerations can learn from their counterparts with lower rates of 
incarcerations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definition and sources of variables   
  
Displaced people  Number of refugees and internally displaced people 
as a percentage of the population 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
  
Violent crime  Level of violent crime 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). United 
Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).   
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics and countries  
      
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Incarcerations 2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Displaced people  1.348 0.872 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Violent crime  2.768 1.136 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
      
 
Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
      
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden;Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; 
Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; 
Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
      
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 978) 
        
Pol. Insta. Displ. P. Crime S O & P Military W. Imports Incarcerations  
1.000 0.336 0.479 0.042 0.336 -0.238 -0.140 Pol. Insta. 
 1.000 0.235 0.036 0.291 -0.058 -0.105 Displ. P 
  1.000 -0.122 -0.027 -0.386 -0.116 Crime 
   1.000 0.215 0.140 0.279 S O & P 
    1.000 0.236 0.093 Military  
     1.000 0.044 W. Imports 
      1.000 Incarcerations  
        
Pol. Insta: Political Instability. Displ. P: Displaced Persons. Crime: Violent crime. S O & P: Security Officers & 
Police. Military: Military Expenditure. W. Imports: Weapons Imports.  
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